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Abstract 
This paper examines the extent of socially-responsible investment conducted by pension 
funds in corporate debt securities. Behavioural theories of the firms suggest a link between 
corporate social responsibility and business risk, particularly over the longer-term. 
Therefore, institutions such as pension funds with a longer-term investment horizon should 
be more likely to engage in socially-responsible investment compared to investment funds 
with a short-term horizon. Using data on the holdings by pension funds and investment 
funds of debt securities issued by North American and European companies, we investigate 
whether there are any differences in the treatment of corporate social performance by these 
different institutional groups in their holdings of corporate debt securities. Our results show 
no significant difference in the corporate social performance of the borrowers whose 
securities both pension funds and investment funds hold. In addition, our findings indicate 
that both investment groups reflect broader environmental, social and governance factors in 
their debt market investments with corporate social performance having a significant impact 
on credit spreads for securities. However, pension funds place greater weight on social and 
environmental factors compared to investment funds when pricing debt securities. Our 
analysis demonstrates that financial flows in debt markets are influenced by social and 
environmental factors and that pension funds are a key conduit. Consequently, capital 
allocation decisions by pension funds could play an important role in changing corporate 
behaviour to achieve more sustainable outcomes.         
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1. Introduction 
 
Investors can have an important influence on the decisions taken by firms. With increasing 
awareness of the wider social and environmental costs and benefits associated with the 
activities of firms, there has been a growth in interest around socially responsible investment 
(SRI). While conventional investment focuses solely on financial risk and return, SRI adopts 
a broader perspective involving a variety of objectives relating to environmental and social 
issues in investment allocation decisions (Eurosif, 2010). The anticipated outcome of SRI is 
routing capital to firms performing well in relation to these issues, termed corporate social 
performance (CSP), while denying capital to those with poor CSP. Consequently, investment 
flows should produce a more efficient allocation of resources in relation to not just economic, 
but broader social and environmental considerations (Sparkes and Cowton, 2004).  
The scale of SRI has grown significantly in the last decade. Eurosif (2010) and the US Social 
Investment Forum (2010) reported total investments with an explicit social or 
environmental profile of over $3 trillion in the US and €5 trillion in Europe. By 2016, reports 
suggest the amount was over $8 trillion in the US and €22 trillion in Europe (Eurosif, 2017; 
US Social Investment Forum, 2017). However, the scale of investment classified as SRI is 
still small compared to the total amount of funds invested in Europe and the USA (Busch et 
al., 2016). If a substantial difference is to be made to CSP, then environmental, social and 
governance factors, known collectively as ESG, must be adopted by the mainstream 
investment community, particularly among the financial institutions which manage most of 
the funds.  
Research has drawn attention to the different incentives for financial institutions to engage 
in SRI (Cox et al., 2004). One group of investing institutions advocated as vehicles for 
advancing SRI through their investment patterns are pension funds (Sandberg, 2013). 
Pension funds are institutions established as public or private entities with the aim of 
providing income for participants in retirement. To do so, the contributions made by 
participants (and their employers) are invested in a range of real and financial assets, 
including debt and equity securities (OECD, 2016). Given the increased scale of pensions 
across developed market economies, pension funds have become large investors in many 
developed countries, with the assets of private funds representing on average 50% and public 
funds on average 11.1%, of GDP in OECD countries in 2016 (OECD, 2018). As a result, the 
way that pension funds allocate their funds can have a significant impact on financial 
markets and the behaviour of firms. This is relevant for influencing behaviour towards 
improving CSP.  
Different investment horizons as well as developments in legal and institutional frameworks 
may produce differences in the way that institutional investors view CSP. Corporate 
sustainability is likely to influence firm performance more over a longer period of time 
(Porter and Kramer, 2006). Therefore, financial institutions with longer-term investment 
horizons, such as pension funds, should be more likely to recognise ESG factors in 
investment decisions compared to institutions with a shorter investment horizon 
(investment funds, e.g. hedge funds). Further, across multiple jurisdictions, regulators have 
required pension funds to incorporate ESG factors in investment analysis (Sandberg, 2013).  
Our work complements the limited research analysing the extent to which mainstream 
institutional investors practice SRI by considering CSP in security selection decisions. 
Drawing on the efficient market hypothesis (Malkiel & Fama, 1970), both Coffey and Fryxell 
(1991) as well as Graves and Waddock (1994) found that the presence of institutional 
investors in a firm’s equity ownership had a positive impact on CSP. Johnson and Greening 
(1999) place their analysis within agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and found that 
pension fund investment had a positive impact on two aspects of corporate sustainability 
(people dimension and product quality dimension).  Work using UK data found that the 
greater the share ownership of institutional investors with a long-term investment horizon, 
the better the performance of investee companies across a range of ESG variables (Cox et al., 
2004; Cox et al., 2008). In contrast, Dam and Scholtens (2012) analysing a broader 
European sample report that the equity holdings of institutional investors were not 
significantly correlated with CSP. More recently, Kaspereit, and Lopatta, (2016) report a 
positive association between corporate sustainability and equity values for a sample of large 
European companies. To our knowledge, no work have analysed the differing attitudes to 
corporate social performance of institutional investors evident in their investment decisions 
in corporate debt securities. This paper addresses this gap in the literature.  
The analysis of debt markets is relevant for several reasons. Regulation and a better balance 
of risk and return relating to their long-term investment horizon has led pension funds to re-
orientate their portfolios towards fixed income debt securities (OECD, 2017). Furthermore, 
the potential impact of resource allocation decisions in these markets on the CSP of firms is 
likely to be more significant than equity ownership. There are several explanations for this. 
Firstly, the balance sheet values of debt for firms are higher compared to equity 
capitalisations quoted on financial markets (Rodriguez-Palenzuela, D. et al., 2013). Secondly, 
according to the pecking order hypothesis, firms avoid using equity as an external source of 
ongoing financing to avoid market monitoring (Myers, 1984). Therefore, external debt 
financing is a more common source of continuing finance for companies. Thirdly, private 
companies finance activities using debt securities so the potential disciplining impact of the 
credit markets touches far more companies than the equity market. Finally, private investors 
are not direct participants in credit markets whereas institutional investors such as banks, 
investment funds, insurance companies and pension funds are. This is important since, 
private investors are more likely to invest using less and lower quality information compared 
to institutional investors (Locke and Mann, 2005). They struggle to incorporate complex 
ESG data and their participation in equity investment creates greater dispersion in 
ownership, reducing the disciplinary impact of equity ownership on management 
(Oikonomou et al., 2014). In contrast, their absence from credit markets means that 
institutional investors like pension funds are more significant in credit markets because of 
the size and concentration of their holding (Scholtens, 2006). If a firm does not behave in a 
sustainable manner, then it risks exposure to market discipline when existing loans or debt 
instruments mature. To ensure credit lines, the company will need to meet the requirements 
of potential creditors like pension funds. Therefore, if pension funds reflect CSP in their 
investment decisions, their influence should generate greater pressure on borrowers and 
improve corporate social performance.  
Therefore, our work adds to the growing strand of literature analysing the extent of SRI 
conducted in corporate debt (credit) markets. Both Menz (2010) and Oikonomou et al. 
(2014) found a significant relationship between a corporate borrower’s overall social 
performance and their cost of debt. In contrast, Stellner et al., (2015) found no significant 
relationship at the corporate level but significant differences across countries. Both Ge and 
Liu (2015) plus Gong and Gong (2018) found that companies with better CSP face lower 
costs when issuing new debt securities. Other studies report similar findings in relation to 
governance (Bradley et al., 2007: Zhao, 2017) and environmental factors (Bauer and Hann, 
2010; Chava, 2014). However, there has been little analysis of differences in the capital 
allocation decisions of institutional investors in debt markets in relation to CSP, specifically 
the differential incentives to conduct SRI in debt markets due to the diverse legal and 
institutional frameworks in which they operate and their dissimilar investment horizons. We 
address this gap and contribute to the existing literature by investigating whether CSP is of 
greater significance to pension funds compared to investment funds.  
Finally, SRI is recognised as a multidimensional construct (Girerd-Potin et al., 2014). 
Despite this, existing studies limit their analysis to either a broad classification (Menz, 2010), 
or limited range of ESG objectives (cf. Bradley et al., 2007; Chawa, 2011).  This study adopts 
both an aggregated construct of corporate social performance but also separate economic, 
social and environmental measures. This permits the analysis of the preferences of different 
institutional investors across these different facets of SRI.     
We find that both investment funds with a short-term investment horizon and pension funds 
with a long-term horizon integrate CSP into their pricing of corporate debt securities. 
However, while both types of institutions treat governance characteristics in a similar way, 
pension funds place a greater weight on social and environmental performance compared to 
funds expected to have a shorter investment horizon. This adds to existing work by 
indicating that institutions with a longer investment horizon consider social and 
environmental factors specifically to be more material in balancing risk and return across 
debt as well as equity investments. Given the scale and scope of international debt markets, 
capital allocation decisions by pension funds could play an important role in changing 
corporate behaviour to achieve more sustainable outcomes.     
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we discuss the different theoretical 
arguments surrounding socially responsible investment. Section three present the methods 
used in our empirical analysis. Subsequently, section four reviews the results of our analysis 
followed by a discussion of their implications. Section 6 is the conclusion. 
 
2. Theoretical Underpinning to Socially Responsible 
Investment 
 
While conventional investment concentrates on narrow financial risk and return, socially 
responsible investment (SRI) represents a broad group of investment objectives across 
ecological efficiency, corporate governance and good relations with corporate stakeholders 
(Renneboog et al., 2008). As a result, SRI is a multidimensional concept, with investors 
using a variety of environmental, social and governance (ESG) criteria, depending on their 
specific objective, to distinguish the corporate social performance (CSP) of firms (Eurosif, 
2010). Legal, institutional and theoretical developments suggest that SRI should be 
considered beyond specialist funds (Busch et al., 2016). Like Cox et al., (2004), our 
framework for analysing SRI among mainstream institutional investors is grounded in 
portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952). In debt markets, this suggests that investors will balance 
yield and credit default risk. The trading preferences of institutional investors will be 
determined by the nature of the products that they sell. A broad distinction can be made 
between long- and short-term beneficiaries influencing the investment horizon over which 
risk and return is considered. In debt markets, this implies that the importance of ESG 
factors in institutional investment decisions may be expected to depend on the influence of 
CSP on the credit default risk of corporate borrowers and the time over which that risk is 
material.     
2.1 Corporate Social Responsibility and Risk 
 
The traditional perspective suggests that SRI by institutions will be at odds with their duty 
towards ultimate beneficiaries. Encouraging firms to consider wider ESG factors in their 
activities will have a detrimental effect on their financial risk and hence returns to the 
institutional investors. Two line of arguments are proposed. Firstly, over-investment theory 
proposes that investors who encourage firms to address environmental and social factors 
through for example, enhanced health and safety measures or modern environmentally 
friendly production facilities, will raise their costs resulting in lower profitability and 
competitiveness (Friedman, 1970). With reference to debt markets specifically, social 
investments related to fixed costs increase the volatility of earnings and reduces 
creditworthiness (Frooman et al., 2008; Goss and Roberts, 2011). Secondly, 
multidimensional targets that encompass not just economic but also social and 
environmental outcomes may produce inefficient performance contracts with unclear and 
conflicting incentives for managers (Tirole, 2001). This implies that by encouraging 
corporate social responsibility through SRI, institutional investors may not only compromise 
a firm’s creditworthiness, but also fail to achieve the desired social and environmental 
outcomes as well.  
An alternative perspective suggests that SRI can benefit investment institutions. In 
behavioural models of the firm, social and ecological issues may be relevant to corporate 
policy (Renneboog et al., 2008).  One such model - stakeholder theory (Cyert and Marsh, 
1963), proposes that better corporate social performance is associated with improved 
financial performance for several reasons. Sustainable corporations should be more resilient 
to changing conditions in the business environment. For example, fairer treatment of 
employees may improve morale. This should attract better quality employees, who are 
motivated and remain with a company for longer periods. This is associated with lower credit 
default risk (Phillips et al., 2007). Moreover, socially responsible enterprises have lower 
costs due to less production-related environmental damage and possible litigation. This 
improves reputation and brand value. Furthermore, such companies often maintain good 
relations with public institutions and other organisations, therefore creating a ‘moral capital’ 
with insurance-like effects that has a positive effect on a firm’s creditworthiness (Godfrey, 
2005). Overall, such firms should have lower business risk and lower credit default risk, 
particularly over the longer-term, compared to firms who adopt a narrow financial 
perspective (Hoepner et al., 2016; Porter and Kramer, 2006). Consequently, responsible 
investors could use environmental, social and governance information to improve the risk-
return profile of their portfolios, particularly over longer investment horizons compared to 
conventional models.  
Another perspective suggests that responsible investors may consider social and 
environmental issues independently of risk mitigation (Sandberg, 2013). This may be 
determined by the values of their ultimate beneficiaries. So, investment institutions may be 
attracted to firms that account for broader stakeholders through avoiding the sale of 
particular products, community engagement, diversity in management and workforce, 
environmental mitigation and employee empowerment. The Institutions conduct SRI 
because of the social and environmental considerations themselves, and not because it is in 
the financial interests of their beneficiaries. As Sandberg (2013) proposes, investors may 
interact with firms on child labour, not because it improves the return of their ultimate 
beneficiaries, but because it is morally repugnant and wrong. In this case, social performance 
will be independent of financial return.  
2.2 Preferences of Investment Institutions and Socially-responsible 
Investment 
 
The theoretical arguments suggest that different types of investment institutions will have 
different incentives to engage in socially-responsible investment (SRI).  Given the nature of 
the products which they provide, the requirements of many investment funds are for short-
term financial performance and liquidity. For example, the immediate redemption rights to 
owners of unit trusts encourages mutual funds’ managers to adopt a short-run investment 
horizon, holding securities with a high level of liquidity (Johnson and Greening, 1999; Zera 
and Madura, 2001). This suggests that these types of funds will not consider environmental, 
social and governance (ESG) factors in their investment decisions since these are unlikely to 
influence risks associated with the investee firms, and hence, investment returns over that 
short investment horizon.   
In contrast, pension funds, due to the nature of their financial products have long-term 
liabilities (Davis and Steil, 2001). This means their fiduciary duty is to hold a portfolio of 
assets which matches this time horizon (Hoepner et al., 2011). Since, according to the 
financial case, ESG factors are more likely to influence corporate sustainability and hence 
creditworthiness over a longer period, pension funds should be more likely to engage in SRI 
compared to investment funds. Indeed, a report commissioned by the United Nations 
Environments Programme’s Finance Initiative (UNEP FI) in 2005, while reaffirming the 
traditional fiduciary duty of pension funds, argued that integrating ESG factors was 
obligatory if such concerns had financial implications.  
Further, regulatory developments have required pension funds across a variety of 
jurisdictions to recognise ESG factors in their investment decisions. From 2000, UK-based 
pension funds were expected to disclose within their ‘Statement of Investment Principles’,”… 
the extent (if at all) to which social, environmental or ethical considerations are taken into 
account in the selection, retention and realisation of investments” (United Kingdom, 1999). 
Similar guidelines have been issues in France, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden (Scholtens, 
2006). Further, many pension funds have signed up to the United Nations Principles of 
Responsible Investment (PRI). This requires commitment to adhering to the principles; for 
example, incorporating ESG issues into investment analysis, and incorporating ESG issues 
into ownership policies and practices. Following these arguments, we propose to test the 
following hypothesis: 
For debt securities owned by pension funds, environmental, social and governance factors 
are more likely to be reflected in credit spreads compared to those not owned by pension 
funds.  
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1 Data  
Using the Bloomberg Profession Software, we identified data on debt securities of companies 
incorporated in North America and Western European countries. Consistent with other 
studies in this area (cf Menz, 2010; Oikonomou et al., 2014) we filtered out securities with 
special features - call options or convertibility into equity – retaining those with fixed 
maturity dates so that the determination of yield to maturity is not complicated. Further, we 
excluded companies in the financial sector due to their different needs for debt securities. 
The Bloomberg database reported 1485 debt securities that met our criteria were in issuance 
on 17th July 2018. Bloomberg records the holdings of these securities by type of institutional 
investor. We focused on direct holdings since these will reveal the intentions of institutions 
more clearly than investments through intermediaries. In order to discern their investment 
patterns and the greater likelihood that pension funds will incorporate corporate social 
performance (CSP) in the way proposed by stakeholder theory, we identified a sample of 
securities held directly by pension funds and investment funds expected to have a short-term 
(ST) perspective (hedge funds, private equity, holding funds and venture capitalists). We 
termed these institutions as investment funds. We did not identify the extent of holdings but 
assumed that since their holdings are substantial, the preferences of the different 
institutional types should be reflected in the credit spreads of the securities they own.  
On 17th July 2018, both groups invested directly in a large number of marketable debt 
securities issued by Western European and North American companies. Pension funds held 
818 debt securities issued by 220 different companies. Investment funds held 595 debt 
securities directly, issued by 210 companies. 293 securities were held by both groups. For the 
regression analysis we identified the distinct securities held by the pension funds and 
investment funds. After removing several securities due to missing observations, this left a 
final sample of 807 securities; 521 held by pension funds and 286 held by investment funds.  
 
3.2 Measuring Corporate Social Performance  
 
Previous work has used a variety of ways to measure corporate social performance (CSR) or 
the more contemporary term, corporate sustainability, since social impact is just one 
dimension. In our analysis, we adopt the Robeco Sustainable Asset Management Research 
(SAM) measures of CSP. RobecoSAM conducts a corporate sustainability assessment to rank 
firms ability to respond to sustainability opportunities and challenges presented by trends 
such as resource scarcity, climate change and aging populations. It adopts an integrated 
model which allocates weights in rankings according to the financial materiality of factors. 
Those with the greatest impact on long-term financial performance have a higher weighting. 
Those with the lowest impact on long-term financial performance have a lower weighting. 
The agency distributes questionnaires to companies covering economic, social and 
environmental dimensions of CSP. Questions are weighted to arrive at a measure for overall 
performance and individual economic, social and environmental dimensions. Responses are 
scored between 0 and 100, with a higher figure representing better performance. 
RobecoSAM use evaluation procedures involving outside interests (universities) to ensure 
the data is meaningful. In our sample, a number of securities held by pension funds and 
investment funds did not have a RobecoSAM score. In this analysis, these securities were 
given scores of zero overall and across the dimensions of CSP. RobecoSAM measures were 
used in several studies analysing CSP in debt markets (cf Menz, 2010). Therefore, our results 
adds to that strand of the literature. 
 
3.3 Measuring Credit Spread 
 
The credit spread of a corporate debt security represents the premium that an investor 
receives for the additional risk incurred in comparison to the risk-free investment (sovereign 
debt). The credit spread on a given security is its’ yield minus the yield on a sovereign debt 
instrument that is identical to the corporate bond (in terms of maturity, coupon rate and 
frequency of payments per year). Hence, differences should reflect several sources of risk 
including credit default risk, liquidity risk and systematic interest rate risk (Menz, 2010). 
However, such sovereign securities may not exist or be difficult to discern (Oikonomou et al., 
2014). We proxy the risk-free benchmark using sovereign yields of the equivalent maturity 
estimated from the yield curve. While not exact, it provides a sound approximation of the 
risk-free return for different maturity periods. In many instances, the borrowing currency 
and ultimate parent country of risk are the same, but, in many instances, they are not. Firms 
borrow in a variety of currencies, mostly to take advantage of lower borrowing costs. In such 
instances, it would be inappropriate to use the sovereign yield of the ultimate country of risk 
for the firm. The opportunity cost for investors are determined by the borrowing currency, so 
we use the yield on a sovereign security with the same maturity in the borrowing currency as 
the risk-free benchmark to determine the credit spread. 
 
3.4 Control Variables 
 
When analysing the econometric relationship between corporate social performance (CSP) 
and credit spreads, one must be careful to control for other factors which may influence the 
risks related to a particular security, particularly financial and business risk (McWilliams 
and Siegel, 2000), but also liquidity risk (Oikonomou et al., 2014) and systematic interest 
rate risk (Fama and French, 1993). We use several variables to control for financial and 
business risks, which should not be covered by sustainability indicators. A company’s level of 
debt, liquidity position and performance can also indicate financial and business risk. 
Measures of these factors such as debt ratios, interest coverage ratios and return on assets 
are used in conjunction with judgements of management quality to determine the 
creditworthiness of firms (Ederington and Yawitz, 1987). While a number of established 
agencies conduct ordinal ratings (Moody’s, Fitch and Standard and Poor), we adopt a 5-year 
probability measure of default calculated by Bloomberg. This is useful in that it provides a 
quantitative measure of credit default risk determined by maximum likelihood estimation. 
Our calculations indicate that this probability measure is strongly correlated with the 
gearing, liquidity and profitability of borrowers in our sample. Consequently, it provides a 
parsimonious measure of financial and business risk. Further, including this rating ensures 
that sustainability indicators ultimately measure more than credit risk in the empirical 
analysis (Menz, 2010). 
Since different industrial sectors have different structural characteristics and cyclical 
sensitivities, their systematic risks vary and so do their risk premia. This pattern is supported 
by empirical evidence, even for firms with identical credit ratings (Longstaff and Schwartz, 
1995). A consideration of sector effects is important since corporate sustainability research 
indicates that the social and environmental issues in different industries are of differing 
relevance (Scholtens, 2008; Steger et al., 2007). We use a series of dummy variables to 
control for the sectoral effects.  
Di Giulio et al., (2007) show that larger firms have more resources to devote to CSP and so 
tend to score highly in these areas. Since our sample includes private limited companies, a 
market-based measure is inappropriate. Instead, we use the natural logarithm of total assets 
as a proxy for firm size (all companies asset values converted into dollars). 
The total nominal amount borrowed at issuance indicates the liquidity of a specific security, 
as opposed to that of a company. The greater the nominal amount issued, the greater the 
liquidity. We convert all of the securities nominal amounts into dollars and conduct a 
logarithmic transformation. Debt securities are also subject to systemic interest rate risk 
since their prices will vary in relation to movements in market yields. Interest rate risk is 
greater for bonds with longer maturities (Kao, 2000). In order to reduce the distorting 
influence of varying maturities on the credit spread we use the modified duration as a control 
for interest rate risk. Since modified duration is related to maturity, we do not include the 
latter as a variable in analysis. Table 1 shows the variable definitions and expected signs.  
 
 
 
Table 1: Variable Names, Definitions and Expected Signs 
Variable 
Name 
Definition  Expected 
Sign 
SPREAD Yield on security minus the yield on the borrowing 
currency sovereign debt security matched by maturity  
 
SAMSUST  
SAMECON 
SAMSOC  
SAMENV  
  
Specified measures of corporate social performance 
measured by RobecoSAM 
SAMSUST – Overall Sustainability Score 
SAMECON – Economic Dimension Score 
SAMSOC – Social Dimension Score 
SAMENV – Environmental Dimension  Score 
- 
B5YPD Bloomberg’s published estimate of the probability of 
default within five years of date (measure of credit 
default risk) 
+ 
MDUR Estimate of modified duration for debt security 
(estimate of interest risk) 
+ 
LNAO Natural log of amount issued (all converted to dollars 
for comparability). A measure of liquidity. 
- 
LNTA Natural logarithm of total assets of the company (all 
converted to dollars for comparability). 
- 
PFOWN A dummy variable identifying a security distinctively 
held by pension funds (given a value of 1: 0 if held by 
investment funds) 
N.A. 
PFSAMSUST Variable measuring interaction between ownership by 
pension funds and different dimensions of corporate 
social performance  
- 
IND Categorical measure covering eight industrial sectors 
adapted using the primary 2-digit GICS Code 
N.A. 
 
 
3.5 Methods of Analysis 
 
We use a cross-sectional regression to test our hypothesis that the credit spreads of debt 
securities held by pension funds are more likely to reflect corporate social performance 
(CSP) compared to those held by investment funds. Previous studies analysing debt markets 
adopt a panel approach, incorporating cross-sectional and longitudinal data on daily 
corporate credit spreads. However, since many of the variables which determine corporate 
spreads change infrequently (social performance measures, credit default risk, size and 
liquidity measures), there is little informational gain from that approach regarding the 
different preferences of institutional investors. A cross-sectional design is valid because it 
enables the work to capture the different propensities of long-term preferences (pension 
funds) and short-term preferences (investment funds) to incorporate CSP in their 
investment decisions through the discrete credit market securities that they directly hold. In 
the regression modelling we incorporate a dummy variable to signify that a security is held 
by pension funds (given a value of 1; otherwise 0) and include an interaction term which is 
the product of the dummy variable and each measure of CSP. This will enable the work to 
discern differences in the responsiveness of credit spreads to corporate sustainability 
performance between the two sub-samples (pension funds and investment funds). We 
analyse several models covering overall sustainability and each individual dimension – 
economic, social and environmental. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Sample Characteristics 
The maturity profile of the securities held by the two groups of institutional investors are 
consistent with expectations about their investment horizons. Figure 1 illustrates the 
maturity profile of the total number of securities held by the two groups on 17th July 2018. 
Investment funds held a greater proportion of short-dated securities (1-5 years maturity 
represent over half of securities held) compared to pension funds (0.35 of total securities 
held). Conversely, pension funds held a higher proportion of longer-dated securities (nearly 
double the proportion in securities with maturities greater than 15 years compared to 
investment funds). Both groups held very few corporate securities with maturities beyond 30 
years. The differing profiles are consistent with the perspective that while investment funds 
are concerned with short-term risk and return, pension funds hold a longer-dated asset 
profile to match the profile of their long-term pension liabilities. Hence, pension funds 
should certainly be interested in financial and business risk over the longer time horizon 
where stakeholder theory suggests that sustainability factors are financially material.   
Figure 1: Maturity profile of Debt Securities held by the investment groups 
 
 Both groups hold multiple securities issued by the same borrow (for instance, 32 different 
debt securities issued by Verizon Communications Inc. were held by pension funds). Further, 
there was a substantial overlap in the companies represented in the holdings of both groups. 
Additionally, both groups had holdings of a large number of the same debt securities (293).  
Interestingly, in addition to public companies, there are a number of securities issued by 
private firms held by both groups. This suggests both sets of investing groups do not have 
significantly different requirements regarding the companies represented in their holdings of 
debt securities. In relation to corporate social performance (CSP), a significant proportion of 
companies across the holdings of both groups do not have a published RobecoSAM 
performance rating. This is to be expected for private companies whose disclosure 
requirements are lower (though a number of these had published Robeco SAM ratings). 
However, a significant minority of the public companies did not have published Robeco SAM 
ratings either. Table 2 illustrates the characteristics of the issuing companies represented in 
the sample of securities held by both institutional groups.   
Table 2: Characteristics of the sample of firms held by the Institutional Investment groups 
  Pension Funds Financial 
Institutions 
Total Number of Securities held directly 818 595 
Number of Entities Represented 254 241 
0.000
0.100
0.200
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0.500
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1-5 6-15 16-30 Above 30
Investment Funds Pension Funds
Number of Ultimate Companies 220 210 
Number of Listed companies 202 192 
Number of Private Companies 18 20 
Number of Companies held by both Groups 149 149 
Number of distinct Companies held by each 
group  
71 61 
Number of companies with a RobecoSAM 
Sustainability Score  
174 (79.5%) 164 (77.4%) 
 
 
Table 3 shows the average RobecoSAM rankings for the companies held. Given the 
significant overlap in the corporate borrowers represented in the debt securities held by the 
two institutional groupings, it is little surprise that there is no significant difference in the 
average RobecoSAM performance scores of the companies held. Even when comparing the 
average rankings for the distinctive companies held by both types of institutions, while those 
held by pension funds have higher rankings across all the dimensions of sustainability, 
analysis of variance show the differences are not significant. If there is a difference in the 
treatment of CSP, the composition of the sample of securities held by the two groups 
suggests it is not through a strategy of exclusion. The substantial overlap in securities with 
investment funds and the inclusion of firms with no SAM ratings suggests that pension funds 
did not exclude the securities of companies on the basis of poor sustainability measures. It 
may well be that sustainability preferences are reflected in different rates of return required. 
Table 3: Average RobecoSAM rankings for the companies held. 
 All 
Companies 
held by 
Pension 
Funds 
 
All 
Companies 
held by 
Investment 
Funds 
Distinctive 
companies 
held by 
Pension 
Funds 
Distinctive 
companies 
held by 
Investment 
Funds 
RobecoSAM 
Sustainability Score 
47.86 46.42 43.74 37.66 
RobecoSAM Economic 
Score 
49.74 47.01 46.63 36.75 
RobecoSAM Social 
Score 
46.29 45.32 41.86 37.39 
RobecoSAM 
Environmental Score 
48.05 46.72 43.01 37.38 
All calculations use a zero score for companies without a RobecoSAM score  
 
4.2 Regression Analysis of Credit Spreads 
In order to test whether the different preferences hypothesised are evident in credit spreads 
we disregard securities held by both institutional groups. The remaining securities 808 
securities were split into two sub-samples – 521 discrete debt securities held by pension 
funds and 286 held by investment funds respectively. Analysing these discrete groups 
enables the research to assess the extent to which the institutional types differ in their use of 
corporate sustainability scores to determine credit spreads of securities they hold. Table 4 
shows the descriptive statistics for the total sample and both sub-samples. The mean credit 
spread is higher for the pension fund group, which may be due to the higher mean maturity 
for that sub-sample, but also, the higher average probability of default. The average scores 
across all the dimensions of sustainability performance is higher for the pension fund sub-
sample which supports the argument that these institutions, with their longer-term horizon 
are more likely to invest in the securities of corporate borrowers which have better CSP, and 
hence, lower risk over that period. However, the results need to be treated with caution since 
the difference is not statistically significant.  
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for the total sample and both sub-samples. 
 Average for 
Overall 
Sample 
(n=807) 
Average for 
Distinctive 
Securities held 
directly by Pension 
Funds (n=521) 
Average for 
Distinctive 
Securities held by 
Financial 
Institutions 
(n=286) 
Credit Spread 1.529 1.761 1.106 
Maturity (in years) 11.05 13.37 6.828 
Modified Duration 7.135 8.243 5.113 
Probability of Default  0.029 0.036 0.016 
Natural Log of Amount 
Outstanding 
19.744 19.586 20.03 
Natural Log of Total 
Assets 
10.99 10.852 11.242 
RobecoSAM 
Sustainability Score 
48.13 48.9 46.72 
RobecoSAM Economic 
Score 
49.03 50.75 45.91 
RobecoSAM Social 
Score  
46.29 46.43 46.01 
RobecoSAM 
Environmental  Score 
49.29 49.68 48.59 
All calculations use a zero score for securities without a RobecoSAM score  
 
Table 5 shows the correlation matrix for the variables to be included in the regression model. 
There is significant positive correlation between the RobecoSAM scores between all the 
dimensions. This is consistent with observations that strong performance in one dimension 
is associated with strong performance in other dimensions (van Durren et al., 2016). 
Consequently, we analyse these measures in separate regression models. The scores have a 
strong positive correlation with size suggesting that larger companies are more likely to 
exhibit better sustainability performance. This is consistent with prior expectations - larger 
firms are able to devote more resources to broader CSP. The Robeco SAM scores also have a 
strong negative correlation with a security’s 5-year default probability (B5YRD). This is 
consistent with the argument that better sustainability performance is associated with lower 
credit default risk. These correlations did not affect the results of the regression so do not 
require separate models.  
Table 5: Correlation Matrix for Variables 
  MDUR B5YRD LNAO LNTA SAMSust SAMEcon SAMSoc SAMEnv 
SPREAD 0.250** 0.293 -0.201** -0.208** -0.289** -0.255** -0.28** -0.311** 
MDUR  -0.051 0.025 0.05 0.066 0.084 0.05 0.063 
B5YPD   -0.182** 0.03 -0.333** -0.333** -0.311** -0.348** 
LNAO    0.044 0.127* 0.121* 0.138* 0.171** 
LNTA     0.22** 0.219** 0.214** 0.22** 
SAMSust      0.96** 0.977** 0.959** 
SAMEcon       0.93** 0.901** 
SAMSoc        0.923** 
*significant at 0.05 level 
**significant at 0.01 level       
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Table 6: Regression results  
**significance at 0.05 level 
***significance at 0.01 level    
 Model 1 
Overall Sustainability 
Model 2 
Economic Dimension 
Model 3 
Social Dimension 
Model 4 
Environmental Dimension 
Variable Coefficient T-statistic Coefficient T-statistic Coefficient T-statistic Coefficient T-statistic 
INTERCEPT 4.114 7.67*** 4.209 7.859*** 4.091 7.633*** 3.921 7.333*** 
PFOWN 0.536 2.866*** 0.463 2.387** 0.505 2.904*** 0.619 3.087*** 
SAMSUST -0.004 -3.018***       
SAMECON   -0.005 -2.919***     
SAMSOC     -0.004 -2.504**   
SAMENV       -0.004 -3.287*** 
PFSAMSUST -0.005 -2.051**       
PFSAMECON   -0.003 -1.262     
PFSAMSOC     -0.005 -2.148**   
PFSAMENV       -0.007 -2.491** 
MDUR 0.073 8.918*** 0.072 8.792*** 0.073 8.849*** 0.073 8.946*** 
B5YRD 3.053 6.352*** 3.253 6.665*** 3.216 6.658*** 2.947 6.220*** 
LNAO -0.08 -3.836*** -0.094 -4.102*** -0.088 -3.748*** -0.080 -3.385*** 
LNTA -0.138 -5.161*** -0.14 -5.243*** -0.142 -5.208*** -0.136 -5.172*** 
CD 0.088 0.701 0.1 0.788 0.093 0.750 0.087 0.704 
CS 0.033 0.277 0.052 0.449 0.035 0.299 0.018 0.154 
ENERGY 0.0487 0.323 0.053 0.345 0.056 0.372 0.001 0.004 
IND 0.153 1.154 0.164 1.236 0.167 1.257 0.141 1.066 
IT 0.351 2.738*** 0.402 3.165*** 0.361 2.809*** 0.352 2.751*** 
MAT 0.322 2.487** 0.298 2.336** 0.325 2.498** 0.313 2.367** 
TRANS -0.485 -2.595*** -0.444 -2.399** -0.499 -2.657*** -0.486 -2.602*** 
r2 0.295  0.284  0.292  0.303  
F-stat 23.681***  22.461***  23.301***  24.616***  
Durbin-Watson stat 2.013  2.009  2.001  2.011  
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We include results for overall sustainability (model 1) and individual dimensions of 
sustainability - model 2 (economic), 3 (social) and 4 (environmental). In all the models, we 
incorporate interactions between pension fund ownership and sustainability performance 
measures in order to discern any differential relationship compared to the investments 
funds’ sub-sample. We adjust for heteroscedascity using the standard Huber-White 
procedure. Table 6 shows the results of the regression analysis.  
Model 1 analyses the relationship between credit spread and overall sustainability 
performance for the sample of securities. The intercept is the credit spread for the sub-
sample of securities issued by utility companies held by investment funds. The significant 
coefficient for PFOWN indicates higher credit spreads for discrete securities from the utility 
sector held by pension funds, setting everything else equal to zero. The two variables 
measuring the relationship between overall sustainability performance and credit spreads 
indicate a significantly negative relationship which is consistent with stakeholder theory – 
better overall sustainability performance reduces risk, and hence, lowers the required rate of 
return. Within this, the coefficient for SAMSUST (which indicates the relationship for the 
sub-sample of securities held by the investment funds) is significant and negative. Tellingly, 
the coefficient for PFSAMSUST (which indicates the marginal effect of pension fund 
ownership on the relationship between corporate sustainability performance and credit 
spreads) is significant and negative. This indicates that the responsiveness of credit spreads 
to overall sustainability scores is significantly more negative for the pension fund sub-
sample. Therefore, corporate sustainability performance has a greater weight in the pricing 
of those securities.  
Results for the models 2, 3 and 4 illustrate where different judgements emerge about the 
materiality of the dimensions of sustainability. In model 2, we find that economic factors 
(largely determined by corporate governance quality) had a significant and negative 
influence on credit spreads. However, while there was no significant difference in their 
influence on credit spreads in the discrete pension fund sub-sample compared to the 
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investment fund sub-sample, differences were revealed in both model 3 (social dimension of 
sustainability) and model 4 (environmental dimension of sustainability). The results indicate 
that while performance in these aspects of sustainability had significant and negative 
impacts on credit spreads for the sub-sample of securities held by the investment funds, the 
negative effect on the credit spreads of the distinct securities held by pension funds was 
significantly greater. This suggests pension funds place greater weight on these dimensions 
of sustainability when pricing debt securities compared to investment funds.   
Therefore, hypothesis 1 is accepted. Credit spreads of debt securities held by pension funds 
are more likely to reflect corporate sustainability performance compared to those held by 
investment funds. This supports the perspective that such factors have greater materiality 
over the longer-term investment period that pension funds will typically hold securities. The 
negative relationship between credit spreads and corporate sustainability performance 
indicates that pension funds are seeking to improve the risk-return profile of their portfolios 
in a manner consistent with stakeholder theory.  
Across all the models, the control variables illustrated consistent signs and levels of 
significance for their coefficients. Modified duration had the anticipated significantly 
positive influence on credit spreads, while an increased probability of default also raised the 
credit spread demanded by investors. Increased liquidity in an issue demonstrated by the 
amount outstanding had a significantly negative impact on credit spreads. This also held for 
the size of a company – the relationship indicates larger firms had a lower credit default risk. 
Our benchmark industrial sector was utilities. Several of the industrial sectors showed no 
significant difference in their credit spreads compared to this point of reference. Both 
securities issued by borrowers from the ‘IT’ and ‘Materials’ sectors had significantly higher 
credit spreads while securities issued by borrowers from the ‘Transport’ sector exhibited 
significantly lower credit spreads.      
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5. Discussion 
The results provide support the proposition that pension funds are more likely to take 
corporate social performance (CSP) into account than investment funds with a shorter time 
horizon. Our analysis has identified the strategies they adopt and the aspects of 
sustainability where significant differences in treatment exist.  
The pension funds do not appear to conduct a strategy of excluding the securities of 
borrowers with weak CSP. Approximately 20% of underlying borrowers whose securities 
pension funds held on 17th July 2018 had no RobecoSAM score. This was not very different 
from the proportion for investment funds’ holdings. Further, while the average sustainability 
performance across all dimensions for the distinctive group of companies and securities held 
by pension funds was higher, these were not significantly so. This does not suggest that 
either group of investment groups demand better corporate sustainability performance 
irrespective of financial return.  
Meanwhile, our regression analysis indicates that both pension funds and ST institutional 
investors adopt strategies of integrating sustainability into investment decisions. Overall, our 
results show a negative relationship between corporate sustainability performance and the 
cost of capital charged to borrowers. These are consistent with existing research on credit 
markets (Chava, 2014; Ge et al., 2015; Menz, 2010). This suggests that environmental, social 
and governance factors are material in the way indicated by stakeholder theory. We find that 
pension funds do not price factors reflecting the economic dimension of sustainability 
differently from investment funds. These results are consistent with studies showing that all 
mainstream investors consider corporate governance (economic dimension) as an important 
factor in investment decisions (van Durren et al., 2016). However, our results show that 
pension funds consider social and environmental factors are more material to the risks they 
face and hence required return. The credit spreads in the sub-sample of securities held by 
pension funds were much more responsive to social and environmental scores compared to 
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those of the sub-sample of securities held by investment funds. Better scores were rewarded 
with lower credit spreads.  
Our findings complement existing studies which show that CSP is important to equity 
ownership by long-term investors such as pension funds (Cox et al., 2004). We have 
extended the analysis to pension fund investment in debt securities. Given the importance of 
debt in financing corporate activities, and the scale of pension funds’ investment there, the 
greater weight they attach to social and environmental factors in the pricing of securities 
could have a profound influence on the behaviour of potential borrowers. A way to secure a 
lower cost of borrowing is to improve their corporate social and environmental performance. 
This should lead to an improved allocation of resources which reflects corporate 
performance in relation to wider environmental, social and governance factors.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper adds to the literature investigating socially-responsible investment conducted by 
investment institutions. There is little work analysing the different incentives that 
institutions have in relation to their fiduciary responsibilities and investment horizons in the 
context of corporate debt markets. We contribute by testing whether long-term institutional 
investors (pensions funds) weight sustainability performance in their investment patterns in 
debt securities more than short-term investment funds. Our hypothesis is based on the 
stakeholder theory of corporate sustainability. Companies with better corporate social 
performance (CSP) should have lower business risk and lower credit default risk, particularly 
over the longer-term, compared to firms who adopt a narrow financial perspective. 
Institutional investors such as pension funds with a longer-term investment horizon should 
use environmental, social and governance information to improve the risk-return profile of 
their portfolios compared to investment institutions expected to have a shorter investment 
horizon. We analyse distinct samples of securities held directly by pension funds on the one 
hand and investment funds on the other to assess whether there is any significant treatment 
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of environmental social and governance factors. We make a novel contribution by 
distinguishing between dimensions of sustainability – environmental, social and economic – 
in order to identify where differences exist. These results indicate that both institutional 
groups considered sustainability important to determining the cost of debt for borrowing 
companies. Our work extends knowledge in this field by identifying that pension funds give 
greater weight to social and environmental scores in the pricing of debt securities compared 
to investment funds. 
The results are subject to limitations. As a cross-sectional study of the holdings of debt 
market securities on one day in July 2018, it does not incorporate how holdings may change 
over time. Further work could investigate how changes in holdings reflect sustainability; 
particularly whether the influence of environmental, social and governance factors on credit 
spreads has increased over time, reflecting the increasing recognition of sustainability in 
financial markets. Further, studies could analyse how periodic announcements revealing 
changes in sustainability performance influence the credit spreads of companies’ debt 
securities. We also assume that these institutions, as significant investors in debt securities 
will have their preferences regarding sustainability reflected in the prices of debt securities 
they hold. This seems reasonable given the scale of their investments in these markets and 
the absence of retail investors but could be analysed further by looking at whether the scale 
of holdings in individual securities is related to CSP in any way.     
Given the importance of debt in financing corporate activities, the significance of CSP to both 
types of institutional investment groups suggests they accept that environmental and social 
factors are material. This could have a profound influence on the behaviour of corporate 
borrowers. Specifically, the capital allocation decisions of pension funds could play an 
important role in changing corporate behaviour to achieve more sustainable outcomes.         
Corporations will seek to improve their corporate social and environmental performance in 
order to lower their cost of debt. This should lead to an improved allocation of resources 
28 
 
reflecting corporate performance in relation to broader environmental, social and 
governance factors and lead to more sustainable business practices over the long-term. 
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